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APPEAL DE NOVO IN VIRGINIA: AN
EXAMINATION OF ITS PRESENT UTILITY
J. R. ZEPKIN*
How do we justify "a system which tries a murderer once and a
parking violator twice"?'
I. SCOPE & PURPOSE
Appeal de novo 2 from the lowest level of trial courts in Virginia to courts
of general trial jurisdiction has been a right of defendants in criminal cases
and parties in civil actions from the inception of the state court system.
3
With the major changes over the last ten years in the district courts, involving
the transition to all full-time judges, increased judicial salaries and increased
jurisdictional imits in civil cases, the time has come to examine whether the
right of appeal de novo should be modified or eliminated. Issues of efficiency,
cost and fairness need to be discussed.
Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, in his 1983 State of the Judiciary Report,
wrote: "The time has come to consider the elimination of the provision for
trial de novo in appeals from both the general district courts and juvenile
and domestic relations courts." The National Center for State Courts in a
1979 Virginia Court Organization Study, called for changes in the right of
trial de novo on appeal. 4 Figures from that report demonstrate that appeals
from the general district courts constitute a respectable percentage of the
workload of the circuit courts. In 1977, 37.1% of the criminal cases filed in
the State's circuit courts were appeals from the district courts. 5 The percent-
ages ranged from a high of 47% to a low of 9% among the different circuit
courts. 6 Civil appeals were only 3.4% of the civil cases filed in the circuit
* Judge, General District Courts, Ninth Judicial District, Commonwealth of Virginia,
and Lecturer, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. The author
acknowledges the very able contributions of Emily Anne Radford, Research Assistant and
second year student at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Also, appreciation is noted to Dr.
David T. Konig, Research Fellow, The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, and to John
Rockwell, National Center for State Courts, for their valuable assistance.
I. McHugh, Fair and Swift Justice, 28 B.B.J. 13, 13 (1984) (quoting the Honorable
Wilfred Bolster, 1938).
2. Appeal de novo is defined as: "Trying a matter anew; the same as if it had not been
heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
392 (5th ed. 1979).
3. VA. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 8, 11; VA. CODE §§16.1-106, 16.1-107, 16.1-113, 16.1-132, 16.1-
136 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
4. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, VIRGINIA COURT ORGANIZATION STUDY, Pt.
11, Appeal of Minor Cases (June 1979).
5. Id. at 297.
6. Id. at 290.
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courts for 1977.7 The percentage of circuit court criminal cases that were
appeals from district courts dropped in 1984 to 29°%0, while the percentage
of civil cases remained about the same.8
Among the agenda items of the Comprehensive Judicial Plan approved
by the Judicial Council of Virginia is the evaluation of the trial de novo on
appeal. 9 In addition, the Judicial Council recently adopted Standards Relating
to Juror Use and Management in Virginia.0 In this document, two of the
stated goals are the improved overall efficiency of jury operations and the
reduction of costs of jury trials."
This article is intended to assist in the debate on the future of trial de
novo on appeal in Virginia. Since the recently completed study, The Adju-
dication of Family Law Matters in Virginia's Courts,'2 considers appeals de
novo from the juvenile and domestic relations district courts to the circuit
courts, the topic is not addressed in this article. The purpose of this paper
is to provide an aid for the discussion of options that might be available to
modify appeal de novo from the general district courts to the circuit courts
in Virginia.
After a review of the existing court framework in Virginia, attention will
focus on the constitutional issues, federal and state, that affect appeal de
novo. This is followed by a summary of the arguments, pro and con, of
appeal and trial de novo. The concluding section offers some alternatives
for Virginia that should comport with state and federal constitutional re-
quirements. The appendix provides an overview of how appeals are taken
from lower courts in other states.
II. PRESENT COURT STRUCTURE IN VIRGINIA
A civil litigant may appeal of right "from any order or judgment..
rendered in a court not of record in a civil case" in which the matter in
controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars."' 3 It is noteworthy that
this statute does not seem to require the order or judgment to be a final
one. In criminal cases, an appeal of right exists from any conviction order
or order forfeiting a recognizance or revoking any suspension of sentence.
1 4
The same is true for traffic infractions.' 5
7. Id. at 297.
8. The Supreme Court of Virginia, Office of the Executive Secretary.
9. Judicial Council of Virginia, Comprehensive Judicial Plan (1985).
10. Judicial Council of Virginia, Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management in
Virginia (1985).
11. Id. at 1.
12. Judicial Council of Virginia, The Adjudication of Family Law Matters in Virginia's
Courts (1985).
13. VA. CODE § 16.1-106 (1982). The statute permitting appeals of right in civil cases
permits appeals without a dollar threshold if the case involves the constitutionality of a state
statute or a local ordinance. Id.
14. Id. § 16.1-132 (1982).
15. Id. § 19.2-258.1 (1983).
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In appeals of all criminal convictions and traffic infraction convictions,
the accused has a right to trial by jury in the circuit court. 6 In civil appeals,
when the amount in controversy exceeds fifty dollars, either party has a right
to trial by jury. 7 A party who pleads guilty to a traffic infraction or
misdemeanor offense in the general district court may, as a matter of right,
appeal the conviction and have a trial by jury in the circuit court.'
8
All appeals are strictly de novo: the order of the general district court is
always automatically vacated when an appeal is taken.' 9 Neither the plea of
a defendant, nor the finding of the general district court, is admissible in
the circuit court proceeding. 20 A statement or testimony offered by a litigant
in the general district court, however, is admissible in the circuit court trial
against the litigant.2' The jurisdiction of the circuit court in appeal cases is
derivative. 2 Therefore, the plaintiff in a civil case cannot expand his claim
nor can the defendant counter claim for amounts in excess of the dollar
jurisdictional limits of the general district court.
23
Other provisions in the Code of Virginia permit the removal of a civil
case from the general district court to the circuit court, prior to the trial,
when the amount in controversy is more than $1000 and certain other
requirements are met. 24 On removal, the case is treated as if it had been filed
initially in the circuit court. The scope of the claims may exceed the dollar
jurisdictional limits of the general district court. 2
In a civil case, a plaintiff whose claim is for $1000 or less must first file
in the general district court. 26 If the amount in controversy is more than
$1000, but does not exceed $7000, the case may be filed in either the general
district court or the circuit court. 27 If the claim is for more than $7000, it
must be filed in the circuit court.
28
Traffic infractions and misdemeanor offenses are returnable to the
general district court for trial.29 The Commonwealth is entitled to bypass the
16. Id. §§ 19.2-258.1 (1983), 16.1-136 (1982).
17. Id. § 16.1-113 (198) (right to trial by jury in civil appeals where amount in controversy
exceeds $50). But see id. § 8.01-336B (referring to a $100 threshold for right to trial by jury).
18. Id. § 16.1-136 (1982).
19. Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695, 698-99, 167 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1969).
20. Id. at 698-99, 167 S.E.2d at 332.
21. Id. at 699, 167 S.E.2d at 332-33.
22. Hoffman v. Stuart, 188 Va. 785, 794, 51 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1949); Stacy v. Mullins,
185 Va. 837, 844, 40 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1946).
23. Hoffman, 188 Va. at 795, 51 S.E.2d at 244; Stacy, 185 Va. at 844, 40 S.E.2d at 268
(1946).
24. VA. CODE § 16.1-92 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
25. Hoffman v. Stuart, 188 Va. at 795, 51 S.E.2d at 244.
26. VA. CODE § 16.1-77 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 16.1-123.1 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
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general district court and present a misdemeanor charge directly to a grand
jury of the circuit court,30 but this rarely happens.
III. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS-CRIMINAL CASES
A. A Right to Trial by Jury
It has been long recognized that the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury "in all criminal prosecutions does not extend to every criminal proceed-
ing." 3' At the time the federal constitution was adopted, there were numerous
offenses, referred to as petty crimes, which historically were tried summarily
without juries, by justices of the peace in England and by police magistrates
or other judicial officials in the colonies. 32 The present day scope of the sixth
amendment right to a trial by jury is governed by the "standard which
prevailed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution."33
In District of Columbia v. Clawans,3 4 the defendant was convicted in a
federal police court of engaging in business without a license and sentenced
to pay a fine of $300, or serve 60 days in jail.35 The maximum jail sentence
which the court could have imposed for the offense was 90 days.36 The
United States Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction, held that the
defendant had no sixth amendment right to a jury trial for this offense.37 In
its decision, the Court suggested some criteria to use to determine whether
an offense is petty: (1) was it an offense indictable at common law; (2) how
offensive is its moral quality?; and (3) how severe is the penalty?3"
In considering the penalty, the Court looked at the maximum possible
penalty, not the sentence actually imposed.39
In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 40 the defendant was convicted of criminal
contempt and sentenced to six months in jail.41 The United States Supreme
Court held that Cheff had no constitutional right to a jury. 42 Using a federal
statute as a guide, the Court concluded that since Cheff's sentence was six
months, it was a petty offense and no right to trial by jury attached.43 The
30. Id. § 17-123 (1982).
31. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); see United States v.
Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Callan v. Wilson, 127 u.S. 540 (1888).
32. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624.
33. Id. at 625.
34. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
35. Id. at 623.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 624-25.
38. Id. at 625-30.
39. Id.
40. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
41. Id. at 375.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 379-80. The Supreme Court used 18 U.S.C. § I as a guide to determine whether
1152 [Vol. 42:1149
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Court ruled that "sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may
not be imposed by Federal Courts, absent a jury trial or waiver thereof."
44
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion correctly pointed out that the Court was
focusing on the sentence actually imposed, not the authorized penalty.
Douglas argued that the potential punishment was a better indicator of
whether an offense was sufficiently serious to afford a right to a trial by
jury. 4 Justice Douglas' position was consistent with Clawans.
In Duncan v. Louisiana,46 the United States Supreme Court held that
the fourteenth amendment gave defendants in state courts a right to trial by
jury in all criminal cases which would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee if tried in a federal court.4- In Duncan, the defendant was convicted
of simple battery in Louisiana.4 The district court sentenced the defendant
to 60 days in jail and a $150 fine.49 The maximum punishment authorized
was two years imprisonment and a $300 fine. 0
Stating in Duncan that "the penalty authorized for a particular crime is
of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in
itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth
Amendment," the United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant
had been wrongfully denied a jury trial.' The Court reserved for a later case
the resolution of "the exact location of the line between petty offenses and
serious crimes."
52
In conjunction with Duncan, and on the same day, the United States
Supreme Court decided Bloom v. Illinois.3 In Bloom, the Court held that
the rights to trial by jury set forth in Duncan apply to serious contempts.
5 4
Criminal contempt should be treated as a petty offense unless the actual
punishment meted out makes it a serious one," or the legislature expresses
a judgment as to its seriousness by fixing a maximum penalty, in which
the offense in Cheff was a petty offense. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The statute provides, "Any
misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months"
is a "petty offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
44. Cheff, 384 U.S. at 380.
45. Id. at 387 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
47. Id. at 149.
48. Id. at 146.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 161. In Duncan, the Court commented that the emphasis in Cheff v. Schnack-
enberg was the penalty imposed, but noted that the criminal contempt statute under which
Cheff was prosecuted had no maximum punishment. Id. at 162 n.35. Thus, in Cheff, the Court
simply used the actual sentence as the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense for which
the defendant was on trial. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 n.35.
52. Id.
53. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
54. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
55. Id. at 198.
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event the authorized punishment would be examined . 6 Bloom had been
sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment, and the Court ruled he had
wrongfully been denied a jury trial.
5 7
In the last of this series of cases, the Supreme Court finally adopted a
bright line rule. In a 5-3 decision, Baldwin v. New York" held that "no
offense can be deemed'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury where
imprisonment for more than six months is authorized. ' 59 The Court expressly
rejected the division between misdemeanors and felonies as the criterion for
distinguishing between petty and serious offensesY' The Court did not exclude
the possibility that an offense for which the maximum imprisonment is six
months or less could be classified as a serious offense based on its history
and nature .6 Two of the dissenters, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan,
would have permitted the states to decide where the line between petty and
serious offenses should rest.62 Justice Stewart, in his dissent, disagreed with
the "incorporation theory" that has been used to make the sixth amendment
obligatory on the states.6 3
B. Minimum Size Requirements for Juries
The required size of the trial jury was one of the constitutional issues
posed ih Williams v. Florida.6 The defendant had been convicted of robbery
by a six person jury. 65 The State had refused to impanel a larger jury and
Williams argued that this had violated his sixth amendment right to a jury
trial as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Duncan.
6
Without setting a minimum number for a jury in a criminal case, the
United States Supreme Court held that a twelve person jury was not necessary
to protect the defendant's sixth amendment rights, but that a six person jury
was sufficient.67 The Court referred to the twelve person jury as a "historical
accident. ' 68 In a footnote, the Court pointed out that Williams did not
require the Court to determine the minimum number that constituted a jury
under the sixth amendment.6 9
56. Id. at 211.
57. Id.
58. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
59. Id. at 69 (1970).
60. Id. at 70.
61. Id. at 69, n.6; see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 121 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting to companion cases Baldwin and Williams).
62. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 76 (Burger, J., dissenting); Williams, 399 U.S. at 117 (Harlan,
J., dissenting to Baldwin and Williams).
63. Williams, 399 U.S. at 143 (Stewart, J., dissenting to Baldwin and Williams).
64. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id. at 80, 86.
67. Id. at 86.
68. Id. at 89.
69. Id. at 91 n.25.
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Seven years later, the Court decided the minimum number of jurors that
is constitutionally necessary. In Ballew v. Georgia,70 a five person jury
convicted the defendant of a misdemeanor offense involving distribution of
obscene materials. 7' Ballew argued that he was entitled to no less than a six
person jury.72 In an opinion that was unanimous as to result and varied as
to reasoning, the Court ruled that a jury of less than six in state court
proceedings deprived a criminal defendant of his sixth amendment right to
trial by jury, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 73
C. Unanimity of the Verdict
In two cases decided the same day, Johnson v. Louisiana74 and Apodaca
v. Oregon,75 the Court plunged into the morass of unanimous verdicts in
criminal cases. Both cases dealt with the same question, but the constitutional
issues were framed differently because Johnson was tried before the Supreme
Court decided Duncan.7 6 The Johnson parties agreed that Duncan was not
retroactive. 77 Johnson was convicted of robbery by a 9-3 verdict, as author-
ized under Louisiana law.7 8 The defendant argued that a less than unanimous
verdict violated the reasonable doubt standard, which the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment required the state to satisfy in criminal cases.
79
In Apodaca, the defendant had been convicted of several felonies by 11-
1 verdicts. s0 Since the defendant's trial was post-Duncan, he argued that the
less than unanimous verdict violated his right to a jury trial according to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of that right in Duncan.81 In both Johnson
and Apodaca, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the convictions,
ruling that neither due process nor the sixth amendment required a unanimous
verdict.
8 2
Both Johnson and Apodaca were 5-4 decisions, with Justice Powell
casting the swing vote. 83 Justice Powell's rationale for voting to affirm both
convictions was his belief that, while the sixth amendment does require
70. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
71. Id. at 227.
72. Id. at 226.
73. Id. at 228.
74. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
75. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
76. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 358 (1972); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145; see supra
note 51 and text accompanying notes 46-52 (discussing Duncan).
77. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 359.
80. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972). Oregon permitted a conviction on a
10-2 vote. Id.
81. Id.; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145; see supra note 51 and text accompanying notes 46-52
(discussing Duncan).
82. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 363; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411.
83. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 356; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 404.
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unanimous verdicts in federal cases, the fourteenth amendment does not
obligate the states to incorporate all the elements of a jury trial in the federal
system, in particular the federal requirement of unanimity.84 Four of the
Justices in Apodaca in addition to Justice Powell believed the sixth amend-
ment required unanimous verdicts.8 s
Burch v. Louisiana6 next called upon the Supreme Court to set the
bottom limits of "non-unanimity. 1 7 The defendant had been convicted of
a misdemeanor obscenity offense for which the maximum punishment was
$1000 and/or imprisonment for one year.8 A 5-1 vote of the jury convicted
the defendant.8 9
The Supreme Court decided that conviction by a non-unanimous six-
member jury in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense deprived an
accused of his constitutional right to trial by jury.90 Justice Rehnquist,
writing on the unanimity issue, noted that the Court rendered no decision as
to the "constitutionality of non-unanimous verdicts rendered by juries com-
prised of more than six members." 9' Thus, while less than unanimous verdicts
of six-person juries are not permissible and a 9-3 verdict of a twelve-person
jury is permissible, there are possibilities in between, such as a 7-5 verdict,
whose validity remain undecided.
D. Permitted State Court Structures-Appeal De Novo
In 1888, the United States Supreme Court in Callan v. Wilson92 consid-
ered whether a defendant could be denied a jury trial before a police court
or a limited jurisdiction court, if the defendant had a de novo appeal of
right with a jury in the second instance. 93 In Callan, the defendant faced a
federal charge of conspiracy in the police court of the District of Columbia.
9 4
The Supreme Court first decided that the offense of conspiracy was not a
petty offense.95 The Supreme Court gave little credence to the government's
contention that citizens of the District did not enjoy the protection of article
84. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring with majority in Johnson and
Apodaca).
85. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414. Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Douglas and Powell
all agreed in Apodaca that the sixth amendment required unanimous verdicts, although Justice
Powell believed that this sixth amendment requirement did not apply to state courts. Id.;
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring).
86. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
87. Id. at 131-32.
88. Id. at 132.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 134.
91. Id. at 138 n.11.
92. 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
93. Id. at 547, 551.
94. Id. at 540.
95. Id. at 555. The United States Supreme Court conceded in Callan that no right to trial
by jury attached to certain types of petty offenses. Id.
1156 [Vol. 42:1149
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III and the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 The Court
further held that the court structure in question violated the Constitution, in
particular the sixth amendment and article III. 97 These provisions embodied
and guaranteed a right to trial by jury "in the court of original jurisdic-
tion.""8 In contrast to subsequent cases concerning the constitutionality of
particular courts systems, Callan involved solely a question of the federal
courts. The process of applying the Bill of Rights to the states had not yet
begun at the time the Court decided Callan.
In Colten v. Kentucky, 99 the Quarterly Court of Fayette County convicted
the defendant of disorderly conduct under a Kentucky statute that authorized
a maximum punishment of a $500 fine and six months in jail."°° Kentucky's
court structure was very similar to Virginia's and the defendant was tried in
the equivalent of a Virginia General District Court. 0' The court found the
defendant guilty. 02 The defendant then exercised his absolute right of appeal
to Kentucky's court of general trial jurisdiction. 3 The only major difference
between the current Virginia court system and the Kentucky system was that
the defendant in Colten could have had a six person jury at his first trial1
°4
The defendant waived the jury at the first trial. 0 5 Since this was an offense
carrying a maximum punishment not in excess of six months, access to a
jury was not an issue on appeal.3 6 Appeals from the lower or Kentucky
Quarterly Court went to the circuit court; trials on appeal were de novo."' 7
Upon appeal from his conviction in circuit court, the defendant's asser-
tions embraced two issues. First, the defendant argued that forcing an accused
to go through a second trial de novo exposed him to the possibility of
increased punishment in the second trial, in violation of the due process
clause and the holding in North Carolina v. Pearce. 08 Second, the defendant
asserted that in the de novo trial, the fifth amendment's double jeopardy
96. Id. at 548-49.
97. Id. at 556.
98. Id. at 557.
99. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
100. Id. at 107-08; Ky. REv. STAT. § 437.016(1)(f) (Supp. 1968).
101. See id. at 108, 112 n.4.
102. Id. at 108.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 113.
105. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying note 100.
107. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1972).
108. See id. at 114, citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce held that
a more severe penalty after reconviction, when the first conviction was reversed, if imposed as
punishment for having successfully appealed, would violate due process. 395 U.S. at 723-24.
Because of the high frequency of such occurrences, the Supreme Court adopted a prophylactic
rule, putting the burden on the government to show that appropriate and lawful reasons for
the enhanced punishment in trial number two existed. Id. at 726.
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clause prevented the second court from imposing a greater punishment than
that meted out following conviction in the first trial."°9
The Court held that Pearce was not violated since there was nothing in the
record or briefs to show that the procedure penalized a defendant for seeking
a trial de novo, or to show that the procedure deterred a defendant from
exercising the right to trial de novo.'10 Colten also lost on the double jeopardy
issue, with the Court noting that a defendant could effectively bypass the
lower court by simply pleading guilty and immediately appealing."'
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court examined the Massachusetts'
two-tier court system in Ludwig v. Massachusetts." 2 The Massachusetts
system was similar to Virginia's with several exceptions: (1) the lower court
had some felony trial jurisdiction; (2) if a defendant pled guilty in the lower
court, he lost his right on appeal to a full de novo trial in the court of
general trial jurisdiction and was limited to only a sentence review; and (3)
even though the lower court conviction was appealed and the defendant was
entitled to a de novo trial on appeal, with a jury if requested, the lower
court conviction could still carry certain collateral consequences, such as loss
of a driver's license and revocation of parole."3
The Supreme Court considered two issues in this case. First, the Court
considered whether the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, as decided
in Duncan, required that a defendant be afforded a jury trial in the first
instance, in the lowest level of courts." 4 Next, the Court looked at whether
the Massachusetts' court structure resulted in a violation of the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy protection as it applied to the states." 5
The Supreme Court answered both inquiries in the negative."16 The court
structure or procedure did not violate the fourteenth amendment by placing
an unconstitutional burden on the exercise of the defendant's right to a jury
merely because the defendant had to endure the first trial before reaching
the second trial, where an opportunity for a jury existed." 7 Nor did the
possibility of harsher punishment at the trial de novo on appeal offend the
prohibition of North Carolina v. Pearce."8
The Court further reasoned that the fifth amendment protection against
double jeopardy was not violated in that the appeal de novo by a defendant
put him in no different position with regard to retrial than a defendant who
109. Colten, 407 U.S. at 119.
110. Id. at 116.
111. Id. at 119.
112. 427 U.S. 618 (1976).
113. Id. at 621-622.
114. Id. at 620.
115. Id..
116. Id. at 630, 631-32.
117. Id. at 630.
118. Id. at 627; see supra note 108 (discussing Pearce); see also Colten, 407 U.S. at 114
(citing Pearce).
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appeals on the record and whose conviction is reversed." 9 In the latter
instance the state in many circumstances can retry the defendant. 20
The Court distinguished from Ludwig the holding in Callan v. Wilson
that the denial of an initial jury trial in a court system which permitted
appeal de novo with a jury was unconstitutional.' 2' The Court distinguished
Callan from Ludwig because Callan involved article III of the Constitution,
which is not applicable to the states.'2 In Callan the court structure required
the defendant to be "fully tried" before he obtained the right to a jury trial,
whereas this was not true in Massachusetts. 23
On first reflection, Virginia's system would pass constitutional muster
under Ludwig since Virginia permits a defendant to plead guilty in the
general district court, to waive presentation of the evidence and then to
appeal the conviction, and since Virginia law entitles the defendant on appeal
to a trial de novo with a jury.' 24 On close examination, however, it must be
kept in mind that Ludwig was a 5-4 decision. 25 The four dissenters, Justices
Stevens, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall would apply the rule of Callan and
require state proceedings to afford each defendant a jury trial in the first
instance.2 6 Justice Stevens wrote in the dissenting opinion, "all of the
legitimate benefits of the two-tier system could be obtained by giving the
defendant the right to waive the first tier trial completely.' '1 27
The swing vote in Ludwig was that of Justice Powell, who concurred in
the result because it was consistent with his view that the "right to a jury
trial afforded by the fourteenth amendment is not identical to that guaranteed
by the sixth amendment."'12 This should not be construed as an expression
of support for the two-tier system as found in Virginia.
119. Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 631 (1976).
120. Id. at 632. Ludwig predated Burks v. United States, which prohibited retrial where a
conviction is reversed on appeal due to insufficient evidence in the trial court to support a
conviction. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
121. Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 629-30; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); see supra text
accompanying notes 92-98 (discussing Callan).
122. Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 629-30.
123. Id. at 630; Callan, 127 U.S. at 557. Counsel for Ludwig advised the Court at oral
argument that under an informal non-statutory procedure, a defendant could submit to informal
admissions of facts. The defendant would not challenge the government's presentation of the
evidence in an abbreviated form. The Court would then convict the defendant and he in turn
would note an appeal. This accelerated the trial and avoided a guilty plea (which forfeits any
right to a full trial de novo on appeal). Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 620-22, 636 n.2. The United States
Supreme Court reasoned that this was less than the being "fully tried" that the defendant in
Callan had had to endure. Id. at 630; Callan, 127 U.S. at 557.
124. VA. CODE § 16.1-132 (1982).
125. See Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 619, 632.
126. Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 632. Justice Powell's position in Ludwig was articulated in Apodaca v. Oregon,
in Justice Powell's concurring opinion. See id. at 632; Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring in both Apodaca and Johnson); supra text accompanying notes
74-85 (discussing Apodaca and Johnson).
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With the question of whether a two-tiered system like Virginia's resulted
in an unconstitutional impact on a defendant's right to a jury trial laid to
rest for the moment, the next attack came from another direction. The stage
was set by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Burks v. United
States. 129
In Burks, the Court held that the state cannot retry a defendant wrong-
fully convicted on insufficient evidence. 30 The double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment prohibits retrial, even if the defendant seeks the reversal
and asks by way of relief for a new trial.' The Court's reasoning was
simple. The appellate court's ruling in reversing a conviction for insufficiency
of the evidence was tantamount to a ruling that the trial court should have
directed an acquittal. Since the defendant could not be retried if the trial
court had directed an acquittal, the defendant should be in no worse position
for having to appeal his case in order to get the correct ruling as to the
sufficiency of the evidence.
32
By analogy, it is an easy leap from Burks to the two-tier trial system.
If, in Virginia, a general district court were to acquit a defendant because
of insufficient evidence, the protection against double jeopardy would bar
retrial. If the court wrongfully convicted the defendant on insufficient
evidence and the defendant appealed, however, he would be tried again de
novo. Since the defendant has no opportunity to appeal the question of
insufficient evidence in trial number one in a two-tier system, this type of
court structure arguably violates double jeopardy and the rule of Burks.
This was the issue posed in Justices of Boston Municipal Court v.
Lydon. 1 3 Massachusetts had modified its court structure after Ludwig so
that a defendant could elect to: (1) have a first tier bench trial with a right
of appeal to a superior court and a jury trial de novo; or (2) elect to go
straight to the second tier trial court with a bench trial. 3 4 This elective
feature was commented on several times in the various opinions in Lydon,
but it is not possible to determine if it was a persuasive factor in the opinions
of any of the members of the Court.
The Justices of the Supreme Court filed five opinions.3 5 Justice White
wrote the opinion for the Court, finding that the Massachusetts' system as
changed in 1978 did not violate the holding in Burks.3 6 Using a concept of
"continuing jeopardy,"'' 3 7 Justice White reasoned that double jeopardy can-
not prohibit the second trial de novo unless the first trial ended with an
129. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
130. Id. at 18.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 16.
133. -U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984).
134. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1816 n.9.
135. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1805.
136. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1812, 1814.
137. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1813.
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acquittal.' 3 Lydon had not been a~quitted, he simply argued that he should
have been.'3 9 The Supreme Court further held that Lydon had no constitu-
tional right to a judicial determination of the sufficiency of the evidence at
the first tier bench trial,'14 and that the decision in Ludwig was dispositive
of the double jeopardy issue posed by Lydon.'
4'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
agreed with Justice White that jeopardy would have had to terminate in the
first trial in order for double jeopardy to come into issue. 142 The term
"continuing jeopardy" without more, however, was a "conceptual abstrac-
tion," according to Justice Brennan. 43 Justice Brennan argued that common
sense leads one to conclude that the proceedings against Lydon terminated
upon a conviction in the first trial. 144 A guilty verdict at the first tier,
however, is not attended by the type of circumstances that could be said to
"terminate" trial proceedings against Lydon for purposes of the double
jeopardy clause. 45 The verdict had "substantially less significance for the
defendant than it would have in a traditional one tier system."' 46
In a second concurring opinion, Justice Stevens urged that the defendant
should have completed the second tier trial and then, on appeal, asked for
review of the sufficiency of the evidence in the first tier trial. 47 If at that
point the court determined that the evidence in the first trial was insufficient,
the defendant's conviction at trial number two should be reversed and the
defendant should be discharged, even if the evidence at trial number two
was sufficient.' 4 Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to agree
with Lydon's position that he was entitled to appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence in the first trial and to acquittal if it was found
to be insufficient. 49 Lydon had brought a habeas corpus proceeding after
the first trial and before trial number two. 50 Justice Stevens thought he was
premature.' 5' The Stevens opinion does take note of the election option a
138. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1813. A conviction that was neither vacated by the defendant
appealing with a trial de novo, nor reversed on appeal, would also bar retrial on the same
charge.
139. Id.
140. Id. at. 104 S. Ct. at 1811.
141. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1812.
142. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1819 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
143. Id. at __ 104 S. Ct. at 1817.
144. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1817.
145. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1822.
146. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1822.
147. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1826 (Stevens, J., concurring).
148. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1825 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149. See id. at __ 104 S. Ct. at 1824 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1809.
151. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1824-25 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Berry v. Common-
wealth, 383 Mass. 793, 473 N.E.2d 1115 (1985). Basing its decision on common law protection
from double jeopardy, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a defendant
whose first trial ended with a hung jury is entitled to a appellate review of the sufficiency of
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defendant has under the Massachusetts' system. 15 2
Correlation of the opinions in Lydon is difficult. Justices White, Black-
mun, Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Burger all appear to agree
that the failure to provide Lydon with appellate review of the sufficiency of
the evidence at the first trial did not and would not violate double jeopardy
rights, even if that evidence was in fact insufficient to support the convic-
tion.'53 In the opinions representing five of the Justices, however, sufficient
discussion of the "election" feature exists to raise the question of how the
Court would treat the issue in a non-elective system.
In examining the appeal and trial de novo system in Virginia, and any
modification of it, the unknown weight given to the "election" features in
Lydon may be significant. A statement exists in the White opinion, from
which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist did not offer differing views, that
Ludwig v. Massachusetts5 4 was dispositive of the double jeopardy issue,
even though the court system in that case required a defendant to participate
in the first tier trial. 5  Virginia's argument in favor of the existing system is
that a defendant can simply plead guilty in the general district court, permit
the court to pass judgment, and then immediately appeal without any adverse
material consequences from the guilty plea. 156
IV. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS IN CIVIL CASES
5 7
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution, which pro-
vides a right to trial by jury in suits at common law where the amount in
controversy exceeds twenty dollars, has never been held applicable to the
states. At least one commentator has argued that the states could abolish
civil juries entirely without offending the United States Constitution.' The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, without oral argument or opinion, a
decision of a three judge court of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana in Melancon v. McKeithen' 9 which had held
that the seventh amendment was not binding on the states through the
the evidence at trial number one before the state can try him a second time. 473 N.E.2d at
1119.
152. Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 1825
n.2 (1984). Justice O'Connor's views on the sufficiency issue in Lydon are not given. In a
separate opinion, she never reached the evidentiary question, but urged instead that the Court
did not have jurisdiction in the habeas corpus proceeding because the defendant was not in
custody. Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1830 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
153. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1814, 1815, 1819.
154. See supra notes 112-128 (discussing Ludwig).
155. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1812 (1982).
156. VA. CODE § 16.1-132 (198).
157. See generally Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973) (detailed history of right to civil jury trial embodied in seventh
amendment to U.S. constitution).
158. Karlen, Can a State Abolish the Civil Jury?, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 103, 104 n.4 (1965).
159. 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
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fourteenth amendment.' 60 The district court had opined that, absent a "total
incorporation" making the entire Bill of Rights binding on the states, "a
civil jury trial is not so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty in a
cooperative federalism as to be required of the states by due process.'
' 61
The district court did recognize a tendency of the United States Supreme
Court to "apply the principles of the Seventh Amendment to state civil cases
in suits involving federally created rights."1 62 The court admitted that the
same arguments used to require a jury in state civil trials involving litigation
of federal statutory rights could be used in favor of applying the seventh
amendment to all state civil trials.
63
V. FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS THAT A LITIGANT IN A STATE COURT
BE AFFORDED SOME RIGHT OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In considering the options that are available for altering Virginia's court
structure, a necessary inquiry is what, if any, constitutional duty a state has
to provide the right to appeal. This is separate and distinct from the question
of entitlement to a jury trial. The United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the state's duty to provide for appeals as early as 1894, in
McKane v. Durston."64 The Court held that due process did not require a
state to provide any appellate review of a final judgment in a criminal case. 65
The holding in McKane remains undisturbed today and has been frequently
cited.' 66 If a state does elect to provide a right of appellate review, then it
must be done in a non-discriminatory manner that satisfies the due process
and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. 67
160. Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1045 (E.D. La., aff'd without opinion,
409 U.S. 943, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1098 (1972). See also Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876)
(affirming that not all trials in state courts require juries).
161. Melancon, 345 F. Supp. at 1045; accord, Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 343, 335
A.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1975); W. S. Forbes & Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245, 256,
108 S.E. 15, 18 (1921). See Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Common Law: No Magic
in Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507 (1973) (concerning required size of federal juries); see also
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HAgv. L. REv. 289 (1966-67)
(arguing that seventh amendment was not intended to codify rigid form of jury).
162. Melancon, 345 F. Supp. at 1044. Contra Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211, 214 (1916); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Carnahan, 118 Va. 46, 50, 86 S.E.
863, 865-67 (1915), aff'd, 241 U.S. 241 (1916).
163. Melancon, 345 F. Supp. at 1044.
164. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
165. Id. at 687.
166. Evitts v. Lucey, -U.S.-. , 105 S. Ct. 830, 834 (1985); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 18 (1955); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937). See also Dix,
Appellate Review of Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L. J. 97, 106 n.77 (1979-80) (citing
McKane to support assertion that appellate review of capital cases is not a constitutional matter).
167. Evitts v. Lucey, -U.S.-., 105 S. Ct. 830, 834 (1985); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745 (1983); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1955).
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In Ohio v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 61 the ruling in McKane was
applied to a civil case. 69 In 1974, the Virginia Supreme Court cited McKane
with approval in the case of Saunders v. Reynolds.
70
VI. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
According to Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution, a defend-
ant in a criminal prosecution has the right to a jury trial, except that a
defendant accused of an offense not felonious may be tried initially without
a jury in a court not of record, so long as he is afforded the right of appeal
and a jury in a court of general trial jurisdiction.' 7' The question is whether
the provision in the Virginia Constitution will permit the same classification
between serious and petty offenses as was recognized in Duncan v. State of
Louisiana.'7 2 If not, absent a change of major significance in the state
constitution, the options available to eliminate or modify appeal de novo in
Virginia are severely limited.
In Ragsdale v. Danville, ' the Virginia Supreme Court recognized that
the term "criminal offense" as used in article I, section 8 did not include all
offenses. 74 There are some acts or omissions that "are not regarded essen-
tially as crimes and misdemeanors within the purview of the constitutional
guarantees referred to.' 1 75 In this case, the Court held that a summary
conviction under a local ordinance in a mayor's court where the fine was
$10.00 or less could be made final by the Danville City Charter without
violating the state constitution.
76
A predecessor offense to our present "Blue Laws"' 77 was the subject of
Ex Parte Marx. t78 The defendant was charged and convicted of violating the
168. 281 U.S. 74 (1930).
169. Id. See Scott, Models of the Civil Process, 27 STA. L. Rv. 927, 934 n.18 (1975)
(right of appeal is never constitutionally guaranteed in civil or criminal cases).
170. 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974).
171. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution reads, in part:
In criminal prosecutions a man.., shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury .... Laws may be enacted providing for the trial of offenses
not felonious by a court not of record without a jury, preserving the right of the
accused to an appeal to and a trial by jury in some court of record having original
criminal jurisdiction.
Id. This provision as to the right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions has remained basically
unchanged since 1776. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 Wm. &
MARY L. Rlv. 269 (1968).
172. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See supra notes 46-52 (discussing Duncan).
173. 116 Va. 484, 82 S.E. 77 (1914).
174. Id. at 486-88, 82 S.E. at 77-78.
175. Id. at 486, 82 S.E. at 78. See also J. DILLON, MUNIcIPAL COR.POATIONS § 439 (4th
ed. 1890).
176. Ragsdale v. Danville, 116 Va. 484, 489, 82 S.E. 77, 78 (1914).
177. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-341 - 18.2-343 (Supp. 1984).
178. 86 Va. 40, 9 S.E. 475 (1889); see Wells v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 834, 57 S.E. 588
(1907).
1164 [Vol. 42:1149
APPEAL DE NOVO IN VIRGINIA
Sabbath. 79 The Court determined that the proceeding was in fact a civil suit
to collect a forfeiture for the offense.8 0 In dicta, the Court observed that
the reference to criminal prosecutions in the Virginia Bill of Rights should
be construed as prosecutions involving "the right of trial by jury as it existed
at the time the constitution was adopted. It is the right as known and enjoyed
by the people of the State at that time that is preserved and guaranteed by
the Constitution." 8 ' Offenses such as disorderly conduct, swearing, drunked-
ness, and vagrancy were handled in a summary fashion at common law,
with no right to trial by jury. 82 The Court further noted that Pomeroy, in
his work on statutory construction and constitutional law, supports the rule
that a "constitution speaks from the time of its adoption."'1
83
This analysis, looking at the right of trial by jury at common law, is the
same approach the United States Supreme Court took in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana. 14 Duncan, and the cases that followed, ultimately ruled that any offense
for which the authorized punishment exceeded six months carried with it the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial.' While the case law has acknowledged
that some offenses punishable by less than six months in jail might be
classified as non-petty crimes, generally the maximum authorized punishment
has been the "bright line" test.
8 6
Identifying cases that would not carry a state constitutional right to a
jury trial in Virginia would depend on whether the Virginia Supreme Court
accepts the conclusion of the United States Supreme Court as to what rights
to trial by jury existed at common law in criminal cases. The sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution does not contain the language "offenses
not felonious," but does employ the same term "in all criminal prosecu-
tions.'"
7
In a very early case, Miller v. Commonwealth,'8 the Virginia Supreme
Court noted the similarity of language in the Virginia Constitution and the
constitution of the United States guaranteeing the right to trial by jury in all
179. Ex Parte Marx, 86 Va. 40, 40-41, 9 S.E. 475, 476 (1889).
180. Id. at 43, 9 S.E. at 476.
181. Id. at 48, 9 S.E. at 478; accord Fogg v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 819, 823, 66 S.E.2d
841, 843 (1951); Trigally v. Mayor of Memphis, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 382, 385 (1869); Byers and
Davis v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89, 94 (1862).
182. Marx, 86 Va. at 48, 9 S.E. at 478.
183. Id. at 49, 9 S.E. at 478; T. SEDGWICK & J. PomgoY, A TREATISE ON THE RULES
WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 487 (2d ed. 1874).
184. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
185. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text (discussing Duncan, Bloom, and
Baldwin).
186. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; cf. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. The phrase "criminal prosecutions"
was used as early as George Mason's First Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776.
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, Vol. I, 276 (R. Rutland ed. 1970).
188. 88 Va. 618, 14 S.E. 161 (1892).
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criminal prosecutions.8 9 The Court described the language in the two con-
stitutions as "substantially the same."'19 The court also acknowledged the
existence of a group of charges that it labeled "petit offenses" which were
tried at common law without a jury. 191 Professor A. E. Dick Howard, in his
book Commentaries on the Constitution in Virginia, 92 confirms that Virginia
courts have recognized a class of petty cases below misdemeanors to which
the constitutional provision guaranteeing a jury trial does not apply. 93
Perhaps the major potential impact of the issue lies in the area of traffic
infractions. Minor traffic offenses have been "decriminalized" in Virginia
and are treated as something less than a misdemeanor. 94 This type of offense
represents a large portion of the general district court caseload and of the
appeals noted from general district court convictions. In 1984, it is estimated
that 71% of the appeals from general district courts, other than civil appeals,
were traffic infraction convictions. 9 If a traffic infraction is a "petty"
offense, and one for which article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution
does not guarantee a jury trial, then the decision of the general district court
could be final, or provisions for appeal could be amended to offer an appeal
on the record. Such statutory modifications are possible without constitu-
tional amendment.
The other area of offenses that could be excluded from those for which
a conviction carries the right to appeal de novo are Class IV and Class III
Misdemeanors, offenses which do not carry any jail time as potential
punishment. 96 Again, depending on how the Virginia Supreme Court defines
offenses that are criminal prosecutions, Class II Misdemeanors, which are
punishable by no more than six months in jail, might also be classified as
"petty."
In 1972 the Virginia Supreme Court had an opportunity to review the
de novo system of appeals in criminal cases in Virginia. The court held that
de novo appeal was constitutional, 97 and that the decision in Callan v.
Wilson' was inapplicable to the States.' 99
189. Id. at 622, 14 S.E. at 163.
190. Id. at 623, 14 S.E. at 163.
191. Id. at 620-21, 14 S.E. at 162.
192. A.E.D. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION IN VIRGINIA (1974). Professor
Howard served as Executive Director of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision.
193. Id. at 145.
194. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-8, 19.2-258.1 (1982).
195. Virginia Supreme Court, Office of the Executive Secretary.
196. VA. CODE §18.2-11(c)-(d) (1982).
197. Manns v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 322, 324, 191 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1972).
198. See supra notes 92-98 (discussing Callan).
199. Manns, 213 Va. at 324, 191 S.E.2d at 811; accord Whitmarsh v. Commonwealth, 366
Mass. 212, 316 N.E.2d 610, 616 (1974); Walker v. Dillard, 363 F. Supp. 921 (D.C. W.D. Va.
1973); contra State v. Holliday, 109 R.I. 93 280 A.2d 333, 338 (1971).
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VII. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN CIVIL CASES
In the federal system, the language "in suits at common law" found in
the seventh amendment was long thought to be a reference to the scope of
the right to a trial by jury in civil cases, as of 1791.200 The United States
Supreme Court instituted a trend toward use of a more flexible approach in
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover.20 1 During the colonial period a strong
preference for the use of juries existed in the colonies, even to the extent of
permitting juries to make findings of law as well as fact. 20 2
The lack of uniformity among the original colonies with respect to the
right to jury trials in civil cases creates a problem in attempting to use the
custom or practice of that era to determine the constitutional scope of this
right. Beyond general agreement on the desirability of juries in civil cases no
consensus existed. 203 Therefore references to the right of trial by jury as
found at common law requires one to look to the English practice of the
time, 204 or to the rights of litigants in a particular state or colony in the
1700's. As one court succinctly stated, "It is paradoxical and anachronistic
to assert that the civil jury of 1791 is necessary to assure fair trials in suits
at common law in this country when civil juries have been all but done away
with in England, the source of the common law. ' 205
The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently defined the scope of the
right to a jury in civil cases by reference to the right as it was known at the
time the Virginia Constitution was adopted in 1776.206 In determining whether
a litigant has a present day right to a jury trial in a civil case, a court must
decide if a right to a jury existed or would have existed for the cause of
200. See Bowman v. Va. State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 372, 105 S.E. 141, 148 (1920)
("It has long been well settled that neither the State nor the Federal Constitution guarantees or
preserves the right of trial by jury except in those cases where it existed when these Constitutions
were adopted.")
201. 359 U.S. 500 (1959); see Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation,
92 HAgv. L. REv. 898 (1979).
202. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation,
128 U. PA. L. REy. 829, 834-35 (1980); L. MOORE, THE JuRY-ToOL oF KiNGs-PALADUM OF
LIBERTY, 107 (1973).
203. Henderson, supra note 163, at 299.
204. See C. JOINER, CIVIL JusTicE AND THE JuRY, 39 (1962); HOwARD, supra note 192, at
244. While earlier legal historians credited the Magna Carta as the source of the English right
to trial by jury, it is now believed to have its origin in the period after the Norman conquest.
C. JOINER, CIVIL JUsTICE AND THE JuRY 39 (1962); HowARD, supra note 192, at 244.
205. Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1035 (E.D. La.), aff'd without opinion,
409 U.S. 943, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1098 (1972). Juries in civil cases in England have been all but
eliminated. Id. at 1034.
206. Standardsville Volunteer Fire Co. v. Berry, 1 VLR 1483, 1488 dec. June 14, 1985;
Alexander v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 554, 555, 186 S.E.2d 43, 44 (1972), reh. den. 414 U.S.
881, vac. 413 U.S. 836 (1973); W. S. Forbes & Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245,
262-63, 108 S.E. 15, 21 (1921); Pillow v. Southwest Va. Imp. Co., 92 Va. 144, 149, 23 S.E.
32, 33 (1895).
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action in question at the time the Virginia Constitution first became effec-
tive.207 In 1920, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Virginia's
Cedar Rust law was constitutional even absent any provision for trial by
jury prior to the taking and destruction of property, because no right to trial
by jury existed at common law in this type of summary proceeding and none
had been specifically provided for by statute. 2°
Virginia has provided the guarantee of a jury in civil cases since the first
constitution was adopted in 1776.209 Few changes have occurred from the
original language to that of the present constitution. 21 0 In fact, the first
Charter of Virginia in 1606 provided that all subjects in the colonies would
have the same rights as those born in or residing in England. 21'
The scope of the present article I section 11 of the Virginia Constitution
which provides that "in controversies respecting property, and in suits
between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought
to be held sacred" will determine the extent to which the General Assembly
can limit rights of appeal from the general district court in civil cases.
Modifications of the right to appeal would affect access to a jury. Article I,
section 11 controls whether a dollar threshold could be imposed as a condition
of access to a jury. Presently, in order to appeal from a general district
court decision in a civil case, the amount in controversy must exceed $50.212
Consequently, when the amount in dispute is less than $50, the parties are
even now denied an opportunity for a jury trial. Apparently no case law
exists regarding the constitutionality of this limitation, yet this restriction
has been in the Virginia Code for many years.
In looking at the court structure in Virginia in the seventeenth century,
one finds inferior courts in which trials were held in summary fashion,
without juries.213 Rights of appeal to courts of general trial jurisdiction
existed, however, with a jury available there.
In the early 1600's, the Virginia Colony had a court in Jamestown
composed of the Governor and his Council. Commissioners (usually three)
held monthly courts in the outlying areas. The proceedings were summary
in nature with no juries. A right of appeal to the Governor at Jamestown
existed, however, where there was also a right to trial by jury.
207. See Pillow, 92 Va. at 149, 23 S.E. at 33.
208. Bowman v. Va. State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 372, 105 S.E. 141, 148 (1920).
209. 1 HENNINGS STATUTES 49 (1619-1660) (citing Declaration of Rights adopted at General
Convention in Williamsburg, May 6, 1776 and agreed to June 12, 1776).
210. HowARD, supra note 192, at 244; Problems, supra note 173, at 171.
211. MOORE, supra note 202, at 97.
212. VA. CODE §§ 16.1-106, 16.1-113 (1982). But see id. § 8.01-336B (1982) (suggesting
that a case involving over $50 can be appealed, but unless amount in dispute is $100 or more,
no right to trial by jury in circuit court exists).
213. David T. Konig, Ph.d, Research Fellow at The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation,
furnished the information that follows. See also 1 HENNINGS STATUTES, 132-133 & 435 (1629);
T. SEDGWICK & J. POMEROY, supra note 185.
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By the 1630's counties had been created and there was a county court in
each one. The right to trial by jury in civil cases in these county courts was
well established by 1642.
In 1658, a statute provided for a right of appeal to the county court
from decisions of justices of the peace, who tried small matters without a
jury and in a summary fashion. The appeal was de novo. From the records
of these proceedings, appeals apparently were seldom taken when the amount
in dispute was less than an amount roughly equivalent to two months gross
earnings of a tobacco farmer.
It is important to note that, as early as the mid 1600's, a right of appeal
de novo existed in civil cases to courts of general trial jurisdiction where a
jury was available. No statutory dollar threshold existed, although in practice,
only cases involving substantial amounts of money were in fact appealed.
In inquiring as to the rights and customs either at common law, or in
Virginia at the time the state constitution was first adopted, it appears that
the Virginia Supreme Court might take either of two positions. First, the
court might follow a literal reading of the statutes and the state's common
law in the 1600's and 1700's. These statutes guaranteed access to a jury in
any civil case for damages, regardless of how trifling the sum in controversy.
Therefore, a reasonable conclusion is that this right exists today, and
consequently, conditioning the right to a jury on a given amount in contro-
versy is unconstitutional. In the alternative, the court might look to the
actual practice or custom which resulted in jury trials only when substantial
sums of money were involved. Therefore, the General Assembly can define
a dollar threshold as a prerequisite to a litigant's entitlement to a jury.
VIII. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
THE DE Novo SYSTEM
21 4
Vigorous proponents and opponents of the de novo structure exist. Some
of the arguments are based on objective analysis, others on a particular
perspective of the system. Following is a summary of the principal issues
most frequently raised.
A. Congestion. Proponents suggest the de novo system permits the rapid
and efficient disposition of a large number of minor cases, while still
protecting the right of a defendant to trial by jury. The low percentage of
appeals supports the position that defendants are mostly satisfied with the
results in the lower court.
Opponents argue that the de novo appeal creates extra caseload at the
general trial court level, and that it would be less burdensome on the system
as a whole to provide a jury trial at the first instance if a defendant desires
214. See generally Robertson and Walker, Trial De Novo in the Superior Court - Should
It Be Abolished?, 56 MASS. L. Q. 347 (1971); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, VIRoIrNA
COURT ORoANIZATION STUDY (June 1979).
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trial by jury. The response to this argument is that permitting a jury trial at
the entry level would substantially increase the number of jury trials, causing
congestion, not reducing it. Proponents of de novo appeal also argue that
appeals with a jury do not take as long as felony jury trials. Opponents urge
that experience has shown that in systems with only one trial level available,
few defendants ask for jury trials.
B. Fairness. Several arguments exist regarding the fairness of the de
novo system. Proponents contend that the de novo procedure safeguards the
rights of the innocent, disposes of weak government cases and helps convince
the guilty defendant that there are no advantages to appealing.
Opponents suggest it permits a minor offender two trials or chances to
be acquitted, but a felony defendant only one. Further it permits a defendant
to use the first level trial for discovery, since he can simply hear the
government's case and offer no evidence. This improves a defendant's
chances for acquittal at the next level. It is also said that the extra burden
of the second trial chills a defendant's desire for a jury as does the risk of
greater punishment.
Opponents also urge that the de novo system favors the wealthy who
can afford the expense, time off from work and other burdens of going
through two trials. The poor cannot afford this luxury. For example, the
criminal defendant without resources for bond might have to remain in jail
for long periods before getting the second trial, and his first opportunity for
a jury.
In response, the counter argument notes that indigents are entitled to a
court appointed attorney in the more serious cases. Further, while counsel
fees and other costs of the proceeding are assessed against the convicted
defendant, generally only a willful refusal to pay these costs, as opposed to
an economic inability to pay, results in any sanctions. Lastly, it is argued
that in civil cases, the wealthy litigant is always able to appeal an adverse
ruling while the indigent civil litigant is not. The civil litigant that is poor is
thereby left in an unequal bargaining position, and is also effectively denied
access to a jury because he cannot post the bond that is required in order to
appeal.
C. Quality of Justice. Opponents contend the de novo system results in
"rough justice." A judge may be inclined to make a disposition that he feels
will not result in an appeal. In the alternative, the judge may impose an
unduly harsh sentence in a case that has popular interest and then let the
next level of court take any criticism for a more appropriate disposition.
Commentators have also suggested that the de novo system tends to
diminish the first court's effort to reach a correct result, because no matter
how careful the judge, whatever the result, the defendant in a criminal case
and all litigants in a civil case can appeal. Simply noting the appeal wipes
out all of the thought and effort of the first court. The de novo system
discourages pride in one's work and leads to an attitude of "Let the next
court get it straight." The lower court judge gets "neither recognition for
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doing well nor direct correction for doing poorly." The system likewise
affects the confidence of the public and the Bar, in findings made by the
lower level of courts.
Opponents further argue that the de novo system deprives lower court
judges of the benefit of appellate court review, including guidelines as to the
law and its interpretation. Without direct review insufficient accountability
exists for decisions, mistakes are repeated, and a lack of uniformity results.
Respondents counter that a one-trial system would so overload the court
structure with requests for jury trials that quality would in turn suffer. The
public would not stand for increases in the number of judges and courtrooms,
and thus the process would slow down. Plea bargaining would increase and
judges would feel pressured to make quick decisions. On the other hand,
many believe that when an appeal is noted, removal of all of the vestiges of
the lower court conviction is impossible. Prejudice to the defendant may still
result from media reports about the conviction.
D. Impact on the Public. The burden placed on the witnesses, victims
and other members of the public that are involved in the trial provides
another argument against a de novo court system. When a lower court
conviction is appealed de novo all of these people have to be in court a
second time. This encourages the belief that it is better never to get involved.
Participants do not understand why a second trial is necessary, and often
feel in a criminal case that their punishment is worse than that imposed on
the defendant.
IX. ALTERNATIVES FOR VIRGINIA
Some alternatives for Virginia that would appear to comport with both
federal and state constitutional requirements are discussed below.
A. Criminal Cases
1. Legislatively define petty offense to include traffic infractions and
local ordinance violations that carry modest fines, such as parking violations,
Class IV and Class III misdemeanors. For these cases, the decision of the
General District court would be final, subject to appeal in the true appellate
sense, either to the circuit court or to the court of appeals. No record of the
testimony would be made unless a defendant took the necessary steps to
have it recorded, in the same manner now followed in misdemeanor appeals
from the circuit court. A tape recording of the trial in the general district
court could be used for the record; the appellate court would simply listen
to the tape. There would be no right to trial by jury in these petty offense
cases.
2. Require a defendant to make an election prior to trial time as to
whether he wishes a jury trial or not. If so, the case would go directly to
the circuit court. If not, the case would be tried in the general district court,
with a right of appeal on the record to either the circuit court or court of
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appeals. This option arguably would not be permitted under the present
wording of article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution. The language
"preserving the right of the accused to an appeal to and trial by a jury in
some court of record. . . ." requires the state to provide a defendant with a
trial in the lower court and a right of appeal. Whether the initial election by
the defendant would satisfy this requirement is subject to debate.
3. Create a unified system with only one level of trial court, but with
specialized divisions in that court. Cases involving traffic, misdemeanors,
felony trials and so on, would be tried in the appropriate division. Since
there would be no courts not of record, there should be no problem with
the language in article I, section 8 of the Constitution. The right to a trial
by jury could be provided in all cases, or only for "non-petty" offenses.
For cases in which a right to trial by jury exists, the defendant would make
a decision upon entry into the system whether to seek trial by jury or to
waive that right. Appeals would be taken to the Court of Appeals and the
Virginia Supreme Court, as presently permitted. The chief judge would
assign judges to the various divisons as needed.
B. Civil Cases
1. Create a unified court system with only one level of trial court and
specialized divisions, including a small claims section. A dollar threshold
could possibly be used to determine which cases would entitle the parties to
a jury if requested. Appeals would go to the Supreme Court, as at present,
or there could be an allocation of civil appeals between the Virginia Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, based on the dollar amount involved.
2. Retain the present system; but enact a dollar threshold so that cases
under a certain amount would be finally tried in the general district court
with appeals on the record to either the circuit court, Court of Appeals or
Virginia Supreme Court. Cases over the threshold could be appealed to the
circuit court with a jury trial available. A tape recording could be used to
supply the record of the proceedings in the general district court for cases
appealed on the record. This alternative has the drawback discussed earlier,
concerning whether the General Assembly can constitutionally impose a
dollar threshold. 21
5
3. Allow trial by jury in all civil cases, but require the parties to make
an initial election. If either party were to request a jury trial, the case would
go directly to the circuit court. Dollar thresholds could be used to deny the
right to a jury for disputes under a certain amount, subject to the General
Assembly's constitutional ability to impose a dollar threshold.
215. See supra text accompanying note 212 (discussing constitutionality of imposition of
dollar threshold on right of appeal).
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X. CONCLUSION
In considering both the federal and state constitutional imitations that
have been discussed, it appears that a fair summary would permit the
following conclusions:
Criminal cases: The State is not constitutionally required to offer a jury
to persons charged with traffic infractions and local ordinance violations
involving maximum punishment by small fines. Case law suggests that trials
of present Class III and Class IV Misdemeanors need not carry a right to a
jury; possibly Class II Misdemeanors may also be tried without injury.
Civil cases: Whether the General Assembly can require a minimum dollar
amount in dispute as a prerequisite to trial by jury is a question which cannot
be resolved here. The strongest argument that can be made in favor of the
authority to impose a threshold is based on the custom and practice at the
time the state constitution was adopted. As noted earlier, while the statutes
did provide an opportunity for a jury trial in all civil cases when the
constitution was adopted, juries were not demanded in practice unless
substantial amounts of money were involved. Further, support for the
General Assembly's authority to require a dollar threshold amount lies in
the dollar minimum which has existed on the statute books for many years.
If it is determined that changes should be made in the present appeal de
novo structure in Virginia, then serious consideration should be given to the
unified trial court system. While this approach involves substantial questions
of political and jurisdictional turf, it is arguably by far the most efficient
way of structuring a state court system. A unified system has all of the
advantages of the other alternatives, plus the additional advantage of greater
flexibility in moving judicial personnel to fit the needs of the system.
This article hopefully will generate thoughtful discussion and considera-
tion of the appeal de novo concept and will assist in ultimately making
informed and reasoned decisions regarding the need, if any, for change.
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APPENDIX
Introduction. This appendix attempts a brief annotation describing the
appeal process in the lower courts of each state. The variety among states,
representing the possible options and combinations for state court organi-
zation, makes strict classification as one system or another difficult at best
and misleading at worst. Some states have a unified trial court and no lower
courts, while others have multiple lower courts of limited jurisdiction. A few
states have adopted a unified trial court system, yet have retained a type of
limited jurisdiction court by creating specialized divisions within the court
of general jurisdiction, and allowing appeals from the associate judges and
magistrates in the divisions to the general court. In a number of states,
appeals are taken on the record in some kinds of cases or from some lower
courts, but tried de novo, while in another instance the appellant can demand
an appeal on the record instead of the de novo trial he otherwise has a right
to. A few states' statutes and Rules of Court give the appellate bench
discretion to hear the appeal on the record or de novo.
The report, State Court Organization (1980), prepared by the Conference
of State Court Administrators and the National Center for State Courts,
Williamsburg, Virginia, was consulted as the starting point for each state.
Other documents, state constitutions, court rules and statutes are cited where
appropriate in each section.
Alabama
Appeals from district and municipal courts of limited jurisdiction are
taken de novo to the circuit court, although district court cases can be heard
on the record by the court of appeals if there is a record and jury trial is
waived, or if only questions of law are presented.
ALA. CODE §§ 12-4-1 (1975); §§ 12-11-30, 12-12-71, 12-12-72, 12-14-70(a)
(1975 & Supp. 1985).
Alaska
Appeals from limited jurisdiction courts are taken to the court of general
jurisdiction, on the record, although a trial de novo can be granted "in
whole or part" by the superior court. If the defendant pleads guilty in lower
court, he can only appeal his sentence. A criminal defendant waives further
appeal to the court of appeals if he first takes his appeal to the court of
general jurisdiction, although the court of appeals has discretion to review
certain aspects of the superior court decision on an appeal from district
court, including the sentence.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.07.020(d)-(e), 22.15.120, 22.15.240(b)-(c) (1982); §
22.10.020(a) (1982 Supp. & 1985).
Arizona
Trial by jury may be had in one of the two courts of limited jurisdiction,
if allowed by law and demanded before trial. Appeals are taken from the
courts of limited jurisdiction to the court of general jurisdiction (superior
court). Criminal appeals from both lower courts are taken on the record if
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the transcript is adequate; otherwise, they are tried de novo. Civil cases may
be appealed to the superior court, but small claims carry no right to jury
trial or appeal. With limited exceptions, there is no further appeal from the
decision of the superior court.
Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-261, 22-425(A), 22-425(B) (1956); §§ 22-
201, 22-220 (B), 22-301, 22-320, 22-371(A), 22-374, 22-375, 22-402 (1956 &
Supp. 1984-85).
Arkansas
This state has six courts of limited jurisdiction and three of general
jurisdiction, one of which (circuit) hears appeals de novo from the lower
courts.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 44-509 (1977 Repl. Vol. Supp. 1983).
California
Small claims and civil actions from courts of limited jurisdiction are
heard de novo by the appellate division of the court of general jurisdiction;
appeals are on the record in criminal cases.
CAL. CIv. & CRm. CT. R. 121-144, 154-156, 184.
Colorado
Appeals from limited jurisdiction courts to the courts of general trial
jurisdiction are on the record, but may be de novo at court's discretion or
if the record is inadequate. Appeals from limited jurisdiction courts not of
record are de novo.
COL. R. CRnm. PRO. 37; COL. REv. STAT. § 16-2-114(7) (1973); §§ 13-6-
310, 13-10-116 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
Connecticut
Superior court is sole trial court in all matters except probate. Appeals
are taken to intermediate appellate or state supreme court.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-164s, 51-197A, 51-197b (West 1985).
Delaware
Superior courts receive appeals on the record from courts of common
pleas, a lower court with limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. Accused
before a justice of peace, alderman or mayor can elect to be tried instead in
a court of common pleas. Appeals from the family court are either de novo
or on the record; appeals from other courts of limited jurisdiction are de
novo.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 960 (1974), tit. 11 § 5301(c) (1974); DEL.SUP.
CT. R. Crv. P. 72(g); DEL. Sup. CT. R. CUm. P. 37.1.
Florida
Appeals are taken from county court to court of general jurisdiction,
unless appealable to the district court of appeals. Florida rules of court refer
to an appeal on the record in supreme, district and circuit courts.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 924.08 (West 1985); § 26.012 (West Supp. July,
1985); FLA. R. C. 9.140(f).
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Georgia
Appeals from county magistrate courts are taken de novo to the state or
superior court of the county. State courts of counties are also courts of
limited jurisdiction and are courts of record. Appeals from state courts (as
well as superior, city and other courts) are taken to the court of appeals and
supreme court.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-1, 5-6-33 (1982); §§ 5-3-29, 5-6-34 (1982 & Supp.
1985); §§ 15-7-1, 15-7-41, 15-7-43, 15-9-1.1, 15-10-1, 15-10-41, 15-10-120, 15-
10-122 (1985).
Hawaii
Appeals from Hawaii courts are taken to the state supreme court and
may be assigned to the intermediate court of appeals. District courts are
courts of record, but try civil and criminal cases without a jury. If a jury is
demanded, the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more, and the "matter is
triable of right" by jury, or if the accused has right to a jury trial "in the
first instance," the case is transferred to circuit court. If no jury is demanded,
the case is tried in district court "subject to the right of appeal as provided
by law." While the law reserves appellate jurisdiction over lower courts to
circuit court, statutes provide for appeals on the record, in both civil and
criminal cases, from the district court to the supreme court.
HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 603-21.8, 604-8, 604-9, 604-17, 641-2 (1976); §§
602-4, 602-5, 602-6, 604-5(b), 641-12 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
Idaho
The District Court is a court of general and original jurisdiction.
Magistrate courts, including small claims sections, are divisions of the district
court. Appeals from magistrate courts are taken to a district judge who can
review the case on the record, remand it for a new trial or hear it de novo.
IDAHO CODE §§ 1-204, 1-705(3), 1-2213 (1979); §§ 1-2312, 1-2406 (1979
& Supp. 1985).
Illinois
Circuit court is general trial court; there are no lower courts of limited
jurisdiction. Appellate court "has original jurisdiction to complete determi-
nation of any case on review, when necessary," subject to such other rights
as jury trial (instead of remand).
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 32.1 (Smith-Hurd
1972 & Supp. 1985).
Indiana
Appeals from the limited jurisdiction courts to the courts of general trial
jurisdiction are on the record (county courts) or de novo (city courts).
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction: A National Survey (1977); IND. CODE.
ANN. §§ 33-10.1-5-9(a); 33-10.5-1-4(a); 35-10.5-7-10 (Burns 1985).
Iowa
The District Court is a unified trial court, but has associate district
judges and magistrates within this court hearing some civil cases, misde-
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meanors, small claims, traffic and ordinance violations. Appeals are de novo
as to matters equitable in nature; appeals in other cases are on the record.
Appeals in misdemeanor cases tried before district and associate district
judges and lawyer magistrates are on the record; misdemeanors tried before
a non-lawyer magistrate are tried de novo on appeal unless the appellant
demands an appeal on the record.
IOWA CODE § 813.3 (Supp. 1984-85); IowA R. Cum. P. 54(3)-(4); IOWA
R. APP. P. 4.
Kansas
This state has one court of limited jurisdiction (municipal court), and
three units in its court of general jurisdiction (district judges, associate
district judges, and magistrates). Appeals from municipal courts are taken
de novo to district courts, except diversion agreements in lieu of criminal
proceedings (alcohol related), which are heard on the record. District and
associate district judges hear appeals from magistrates. Appeals taken from
magistrates are heard de novo, except that convictions under diversion
agreements are appealed on the record, and civil cases where a record has
been made are taken to the court of appeals, unless law provides for review
in district or supreme court.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-4416(b), 12-4601 (1982); §§ 22-2909(c), 22-3609,
22-3610 (1981 & Supp. 1984); § 60-2103(o) (1983); § 60-2101 (1983 & Supp.
1984).
Kentucky
Kentucky abolished four special limited jurisdiction courts a created
single district court system and abolished trial de novo appeal in 1978.
Appeals from the district court to the circuit court are on the record.
Ky. R. Crv. P. 72, 73, 75; Ky. R. Clum. P. 12.02-12.82; Nat'l Ctr. for
State Courts, Final Report: Virginia Court Organization Study, submitted
to Judicial Council of Virginia (1979), at 292-3.
Louisiana
General jurisdiction court hears criminal appeals from city, parish and
municipal courts, except cases triable by jury which are appealed to courts
of appeals. "These appeals shall be on law alone." Electronic recording can
be used when appeal is taken to district court. Criminal appeals from mayor
and justice of peace court are heard de novo in district court. Appeals in
civil cases where the amount in controversy is no more than $100 are tried
de novo without a jury.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1137, 13:1897, 13:2493, 13:2498 (West 1983);
88 13:1896, 13:2501.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); LA. CODE CaRI. PRoc.
ANN. article 912 (1984).
Maine
Maine abolished appeal de novo and adopted a one trial system in 1982.
In Class D and E criminal proceedings, a defendant can waive jury trial and
elect to be tried in the limited jurisdiction district court with an appeal to
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the superior court, having general jurisdiction, on questions of law only.
Other appeals to superior court in criminal cases are on the record.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, & 156 (1964); tit. 15, § 2114 (1964 & Supp.
1984-85); ME. R. CmmIe. P. 93; Report of the Committee on Juries of Six,
Elimination of trial De Novo in Criminal Cases, to Chief Justice of the
District Ct. Dept. (MA) (1984), at 39-40; Final Report at 294.
Maryland
Appeals are de novo from the courts of limited jurisdiction to the courts
of general jurisdiction. In a civil case involving more than $10,000 or in any
case in which the parties so agree, appeal from the lower or district court to
the circuit court is on the record. In all other cases, appeals from the district
court to the circuit court are de novo.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-401 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
Massachusetts
Trial courts were consolidated into a single trial court of the Common-
wealth consisting of seven courts or departments. District court and Boston
municipal court hear appeals de novo taken up in their own departments.
Defendants have a choice of a jury trial in the first instance, or a bench trial
and de novo appeal.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218 § 1 (West 1958 & Supp. 1985); ch. 218,
§ 27A (West Supp. 1985); Elimination of Trial de Novo, at 20-21.
Michigan
Appeals from the district court to the circuit court are on the record.
Appeals from the municipal courts to the circuit courts are de novo. Appeals
from traffic bureau and magistrates divisions within the district court are de
novo to the district court. A party who tries a case in small claims division
waives his right of appeal.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.8341, 600.8342, 600.8391, 600.8412,
600.8515 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985); § 774.34 (West 1982); MICH. CT. R.
4.10(G).
Minnesota
Conciliation courts try civil disputes up to $1250 in value, with a "trial
on the merits" in county court on appeal. Trial by jury of misdemeanors
occurs in county courts. Trial by jury of gross misdemeanors and felonies
occurs in district courts. Only offenses punishable by incarceration are triable
by jury. The right to a jury trial can be asserted in civil cases. Until 1983,
misdemeanor conviction in county court entitled a defendant to trial de novo
or an appeal on the record in district court. Current rules take the appeal to
the state court of appeals and omit reference to trial de novo.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 487.23, 487.30, 487.39 (West Supp. 1985); MINN.
R. Cwm. P. 26.01, 28.02.
Mississippi
Appeals from justice courts are "tried anew" in county court, or in
circuit court when there is no county court. Appeals from county court are
heard on the record in circuit or chancery court, except when a new trial is
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granted and tried de novo by the circuit or chancery court.
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-51-79, 11-51-81, 11-51-91, 99-35-1 (1972); § 11-
51-85 (1972 & Supp. 1984).
Missouri
Circuit court now has no appellate jurisdiction except in civil cases tried
before the associate circuit division without a jury. This is a de novo trial.
Civil cases tried with a jury, misdemeanors and violations of county ordi-
nances are appealed on the record to the "appropriate appellate court."
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 478.070, 512.180, 512.190, 512.250, 512.270 (Vernon
1949 & Supp. 1985).
Montana
Appeals from courts of limited jurisdiction to district courts are de novo.
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 4; 1984 MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-5-303 (1983).
Nebraska
Small claims court appeals are de novo to the district court without any
jury. Other appeals from the courts of limited jurisdiction to the district
court, which is the court of general trial jurisdiction, are on the record.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-302 (1943); §§ 24-501, 29-613 (1943 & Supp. 1984);
§§ 24-541.06, 24-541.07 (Supp. 1984).
Nevada
Current law provides for an appeal on the record in criminal cases
appealed from justice of the peace and municipal courts to district courts.
With respect to civil proceedings taken up from justice and municipal courts
to district courts, the law provides that a case appealed must not be tried
anew.
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 189.050, 266.595 (1979); JUSTICE COURT R. Crv. P.
77.
New Hampshire
Misdemeanor appeals from limited jurisdiction courts heard de novo in
court of general jurisdiction. A civil case is transferred from district to
superior (general trial) court if jury trial is demanded.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 502:23, 502-A:12, 502-A:15 (1983); 599 (1974).
New Jersey
Appeals from municipal courts are taken to the law division of the
superior court. Other courts of limited jurisdiction (county, tax, juvenile)
appeal to appellate division of the superior court. Criminal and civil appeals
from municipal court can be heard de novo on the record, in which case
they receive an independent determination of facts. Such appeals can instead
be remanded for a new trial, or heard by plenary trial de novo without a
jury. The appellate division can exercise original jurisdiction necessary for a
complete determination of the matter on review.
1985 R. GOVERNING CT. N.J. 2:2-3, 2:10-5, 3:23-8(a), 4:74-3.
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New Mexico
Appeals from courts of limited jurisdiction are taken to the district
court. Metropolitan courts are courts of record in civil cases, but not
criminal. A jury trial is available in civil cases unless waived, but in criminal
cases a jury trial is available only when the penalty is more than 90 days in
jail. Criminal appeals are heard de novo. Magistrate courts are not courts
of record; appeals are tried de novo. Appeals from municipal courts are
heard de novo in district court without a jury.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-8A-5, 34-8A-6, 35-1-1, 35-15-10 (1978); §§ 34-
8A-3, 35-13-2 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
New York
Appeals from limited jurisdiction courts are taken to county court or to
an appellate term on the record. Generally there is no appeal in small claims
cases.
See Un. Dist. Ct. Act §§ 1701-04, 1807, 2018-19 (1963 & Supp. 1984-
85); N.Y. Civ. PROC. LAW § 5501 (Cnsol. 1978); N.Y. CUM. PROc. LAw §
460.10 (McKinney 1983). D. Siegel, New York Practice (1978 Supp. 1981-
82), §§ 8 et seq., 524, 536 et seq.
North Carolina
Small claims and criminal offenses tried by magistrates are heard de
novo in district court. Criminal appeals from district court are tried de novo
in superior (general jurisdiction) court. Civil appeals from district court are
taken to the court of appeals.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-27(c), 7A-228(a), 7A-290 (1981).
North Dakota
North Dakota has two types of limited jurisdiction courts, county courts
and municipal courts. Appeals from the municipal court are de novo. Appeals
from the county court appear to be on the record.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-01 (1974); § 27-01-01 (1974 & Supp. 1983);
§§ 27-07.1-01, 27-07.1-18 (Supp. 1983); § 27-07.1-17 (Supp. 1983 & Supp.
1985); N.D. R. CRm. P. 37(g); N.D. R. APP. P. l(a), 1(c).
Ohio
Appeals from the limited jurisdiction courts are de novo generally, with
provisions for appeal on the record where only issues of law are involved.
The court to which the appeal goes may rely on the record in part and may
call for additional evidence on any part of the trial the court thinks necessary.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. 1905.22; 1905.25, 1901.30; 1921.01, 1913.27,
1921.14, 2501.21; 2506.01 (Page Supp. 1984).
Oklahoma
All appeals from courts of limited jurisdiction to courts of general
jurisdiction are de novo.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 27-129 (Supp. 1984-85).
Oregon
Appeals from three of the four courts of limited jurisdiction to the court
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of general trial jurisdiction are de novo. Appeals from the fourth limited
jurisdiction court are on the record but go to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
Audio recordings are used for the record.
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 46.430(2); 46.430(4), 138.220, 53.090, 221.350, 5.120
(1983).
Pennsylvania
All appeals from the courts of limited jurisdiction to courts of general
jurisdiction are de novo.
PA. MINOR CT. Crv. R. 1007; PA. R. CRim. P. 64, 6006.
Rhode Island
Superior court of general jurisdiction hears appeals de novo from district
and municipal courts of limited jurisdiction for any offense except violations,
which are taken by certiorari to the state supreme court. Civil appeals from
district court are heard in the supreme court.
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 8-8-3, 8-8-3.2 (Supp. 1984), §§ 12-3-1; 12-17-1, 12-
22-1, 12-22-1.1, 12-22-9 (1981).
South Carolina
Appeals from magistrate courts are heard in county or circuit courts.
County court appeals are taken to circuit court. Appeal is heard "on papers
in the case," including testimony, although the court has discretion to
examine a witness when a fact is at issue in the appeal. The appellate bench
can affirm, reverse, modify or order new trial.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-9-120 (Law. Co-op. 1977); §§ 18-1-140, 18-7-10,
18-7-130, 18-7-170, 18-7-180, 18-7-420 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
South Dakota
South Dakota has a unified trial court with divisions. Generally, all
appeals are to the state appellate court and on the record. A small claims
appeal is heard de novo in circuit court when no record is kept. Magistrates
can be law-trained or non-lawyer judges, in which case their courts are not
of record.
S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 16-6-10; 16-12A-26; 16-12A-27; 16-12A2.1
(1979).
Tennessee
All appeals from courts of limited jurisdiction to courts of general trial
jurisdiction are de novo.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-4-108; 27-5-102; 27-5-108 (1980); 27-3-131
(Supp. 1985).
Texas
Two "levels" of limited jurisdiction courts exist in Texas, with the higher
level hearing appeals de novo from the courts below. Appeals from this level
of limited jurisdiction court bypass the general trial court and go to an
appellate court on the record.
TEx. CONST. art. V, §§ 8, 16; TEx. CODE CRuI. P. art. 4.05, 4.08, 4.09,
44.17, 45.10.
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Utah
Most appeals from the limited jurisdiction courts to the general trial
jurisdiction courts are on the record; small civil claims and appeals from
justice courts are heard de novo.
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5; UTAH CODE ANN. 77-35-26 (1953 & Supp.
1983); § 78-4-11 (Supp. 1983).
Vermont
All appeals from the courts of limited jurisdiction are on the record to
the court of last resort in the State.
VT. R. APP. P. 3.
Virginia
Each appeal from a court of limited jurisdiction is to a court of general
trial jurisdiction and is de novo.
VA. CODE §§ 16.1-106, 16.1-132 (1982).
Washington
Appeals from court of limited jurisdiction are heard de novo in general
trial court.
WASH. REv. CODE § 2.08.020 and ann. (West 1961, Supp. 1985).
West Virginia
A judicial reorganization amendment to the state constitution merged
limited jurisdiction courts (except magistrates court) into the circuit court.
Appeals from magistrates courts are heard de novo in circuit court, except
there is generally no appeal from a plea of guilty if the defendant had
counsel. Municipal courts are not part of the state court system. The mayor
can hear, convict and sentence persons who have violated ordinances. An
appeal can apparently be taken de novo to circuit court.
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 6; W. VA. CODE § 8-10-1 (1984); § 50-
5-12 (1980); § 50-5-13 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
Wisconsin
Appeals from limited jurisdiction courts to courts of general trial juris-
diction may be de novo if requested by either party or by the court's own
motion. Otherwise appeals are on the record.
WIs. CONST. art. 7 § 8; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 800.14(4) (West 1981);
800.14(5) (West 1981 & Supp. 1985).
Wyoming
All appeals from limited jurisdiction courts to general jurisdiction courts
are on the record. Tape recorded transcripts are used to make the record
and juries are available in the limited jurisdiction courts.
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